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INTRODUCTION
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
sets the rules for the Internet addressing systems that make it possible for
users to send email, view webpages, or otherwise connect to Internet re-
sources. Its most visible function is to supervise the domain name system,
which identifies Internet resources by "domain names" such as "wayne.edu"
or "threecats.net." ICANN's control gives it authority over how domain
names are structured and what they look like; it gives it regulatory and eco-
nomic power over a substantial set of businesses involved with Internet
addressing.
This is no small thing. Individuals and businesses, today, control (and
pay for) over 200 million domain names.' And ICANN's decisions have
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I owe thanks to Jessica Litman, A.
Michael Froomkin, Milton Mueller, Fiona Alexander, Avri Doria, Bret Fausett, Jeanette Hof-
mann, and Paul Stahura for answering questions or pointing out my errors. None of them is
responsible for (or necessarily agrees with) anything I say here. I was a legal-scholar-in-
residence at the U.S. Federal Communications Commission in 1997-98, and participated via
an interagency working group in the U.S. government's policymaking process regarding Inter-
net identifiers, during the period leading up to ICANN's creation. Later on, I was the co-chair
of an ICANN working group established to formulate recommendations regarding the de-
ployment of new generic top-level domains. None of those organizations necessarily shares
my views either.
1. See The Domain Name Industry Brief, VERISIGN (Nov. 2010), http://www.
verisigninc.com/assetsVerisignDNIB-Nov201 0_WEB.pdf.
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bite: they are responsible for mechanisms such as the "uniform dispute reso-
lution policy" that divests registrants of names deemed too similar to other
entities' trademarks,2 along with a variety of other mechanisms designed to
fence off particular categories of domain names from registration by the
wrong people (or by anyone at all).' They determine what sort of names are
visible on the Net, and what sort are not.4
What kind of organization, then, is ICANN? It is in form a private body,
a California-based § 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation.5 Yet when it comes to
ICANN, the usual lines between what is private and what is public have
always been blurred. In this Essay, I will address the relationship between
ICANN and national governments, and how that relationship has changed
over time. I'll discuss the changing nature of ICANN's relationship with the
U.S. government, as well as the evolution of other national governments'
policy-making role within ICANN.
The U.S. government was deeply involved with ICANN at the time of
its formation; other world governments played a much smaller role. Those
governments' functional role remained narrow even after ICANN's reinven-
tion in 2002 gave them a greater formal say. In recent years, though, the
United States has channeled most of its interaction with ICANN into a mul-
tilateral forum-ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC), with
representatives from a wide range of national governments-and the GAC
has been increasingly involved in ICANN processes. But in part by virtue of
an institutional structure carried over from the organization's formation,
when it was thought that world governments should have little formal role in
a "privatized" ICANN, the relationship today between ICANN and national
governments is incoherent and problematic.
2. See generally KONSTANTINOs KOMAITIS, THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMAIN NAME
REGULATION: DOMAIN NAMES AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS IN A MARK-DOMINATED WORLD
(2010); A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-Causes and
(Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 605 (2002).
3. See, e.g.,.COM Agreement Appendix 6 Schedule of Reserved Names, ICANN (Mar.
1, 2006), http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/agreements/verisignlappendix-06-01mar06.htm.
4. See Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, ICANN, http://www.icann.orgludrp
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011). For a discussion of whether ICANN could, in the future, seek to
leverage its control over the domain name system to achieve more far-reaching goals, see A.
Michael Froomkin, Almost Free: An Analysis of ICANN's 'Affirmation of Commitments', 9 J.
TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 187, 214-19 (2010).
5. See About ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (de-
scribing ICANN as "a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with participants from all over
the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable"); Articles of In-
corporation for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN (Nov. 21,
1998), http://www.icann.org/en/general/articles.htm.
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1. IN THE BEGINNING
The story of ICANN's creation has been told in detail elsewhere. 6 From
1993 to 1998, two actors played crucial roles in the domain name space. The
first was Dr. Jon Postel, who had earlier assumed the task of assigning
blocks of IP addresses to computer networks and who administered the root
zone of the Internet domain name system, with authority over which top-
level domains (TLDs) were visible in the name space and which entities had
authority to operate them. The second was a company then known as Net-
work Solutions, Inc. (NSI), which performed registration services in the
.com, net, .org, and .edu top-level domains and maintained those domains'
master databases.' NSI also maintained the computer server containing the
authoritative copy of the root zone; it made changes to that file at Postel's
direction.' The U.S. government funded Dr. Postel via contracts with his
employer, the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern
California.9 The National Science Foundation (NSF) underwrote NSI's do-
main registration services until 1995, and maintained additional authority
over NSI via an NSF-NSI cooperative agreement until 1998. o
In 1998, the U.S. government midwifed a new organization called
ICANN, a California nonprofit corporation. ICANN assumed Postel's au-
thority over the root zone, and sought to exert control over NSI." The U.S.
government described ICANN's formation and assertion of authority as part
of its "privatization of the domain name system." 2 But this description
6. See generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE
AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Jona-
than Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000).
7. Network Solutions, Inc. was acquired by Verisign, Inc. in 2000. Network Solutions
is a Remarkable Company!, NETWORK SOLUTIONS, http://about.networksolutions.com/site/
network-solutions-is-a-remarkable-company/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). Verisign still operates
the .com and net registries, Verisign Domain Name Registries, VERISIGN, http://www.
verisigninc.com/enUS/products-and-services/domain-name-services/index.xhtml?loc=enUS
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011), as well as the .gov registry under a contract with the General Ser-
vices Administration, DOTGOV Internet Domain Name Registration Service, FED. BUS.
OPPORTUNITIES, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5e6b0085f30c96
bbc4ebee4c5a679a45&tab=core&_cview=1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). Verisign's revenues from
domain name services exceed $600 million annually. Fact Sheet, VERISIGN, https://investor.
verisign.com/factsheet.cfm (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). In 2003, it spun off a subsidiary with the
"Network Solutions" name to operate as a domain name registrar. Network Solutions is a Re-
markable Company!, NETWORK SOLUTIONS, http://about.networksolutions.com/site/network-
solutions-is-a-remarkable-company/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
8. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 199.
9. Id. at 198.
10. Id. at 198-200; see also Mueller, supra note 6, at 182.
I1. Interested parties had initially planned that Postel would serve as ICANN's Chief
Technical Officer. Postel died unexpectedly, though, just as ICANN was being formed. See
Weinberg, supra note 6, at 210.
12. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and Addresses,
63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 5, 1998), available at http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-
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obscured more than it revealed. To be sure, the U.S. government had funded
the development and maintenance of the naming and addressing infrastruc-
ture. But Postel had made his key decisions without meaningful policy
supervision by the U.S. Department of Defense, and NSI had made its own
with only a limited degree of supervision by the National Science
Foundation.13 In that sense, domain name decision-making had been essen-
tially private all along.14
Before ICANN's creation, U.S. government authority over the domain
name space was unclear. Key actors denied or challenged that authority.
Those actors included NSI, which took the view that it owned the .com, .net,
and .org registration databases, and-upon the expiration in 1998 of its five-
year cooperative agreement with the National Science Foundation-would
be free to do whatever it wanted with them.' 5 They included a new body
called the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC), set up in 1996 with
Postel's blessing, which sought to establish its own new domain naming
order.'6 They included Postel himself: in January 1998, Postel famously at-
tempted to demonstrate his independence from U.S. policy supervision and
control by directing the root server operators to take their copies of the root
zone directly from him, rather than from the NSI-operated server on which
the authoritative root zone was then stored. White House senior adviser Ira
Magaziner, then in charge of the U.S. government's domain name policy
paper-05jun98.htm; Amendment 6 to ICANNIDOC Memorandum of Understanding, ICANN
(Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.icann.org/en/generallamend6-jpamou-17sepO3.htm
(explaining that the formation of ICANN was part of a process "of privatizing the technical
management of the Internet and its underlying domain name system (DNS) now performed by
or on behalf of the U.S. Government or by third parties under arrangements or agreements
with the U.S. Government").
13. "Limited" supervision, to be sure, is not the same as no supervision. A variety of
NSI registration policies-including an initial ban on multiple domain name registrations by a
single entity, as well as other policies directed towards making registration easy-stemmed
from NSF policy choices. See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 106-7. But NSF, which saw itself as
a funding agency rather than a regulatory one, was increasingly disinclined to engage in first-
order domain-name policymaking after it stopped underwriting the registration process in
1995. The Defense Department, for its part, ended any involvement in the substance of do-
main name decision-making in the 1980s (although a well-informed industry observer has
conveyed his recollection to me that the Department's "contract technical representative" was
involved in that decision-making during the early days of the domain name system). See E-
mail from Anthony M. Rutkowski to author (July 6, 2000) (on file with author).
14. See Harold Feld, Structured to Fail: ICANN and the "Privatization" Experiment, in
WHO RULES THE NET? INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 333 (Adam Thierer &
Clyde Crews, Jr. eds., 2003).
15. See Domain Name System Privatization: Is ICANN Out of Control?: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th
Cong. 104-12 (1999) (testimony of Jim Rutt, CEO, Network Solutions).
16. See Craig L. Simon, Launching the DNS War: Dot-Coin Privatization and the Rise
of Global Internet Governance (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Miami), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/58805571/Launching-the-DNS-War-Dot-
Com-Privatization-and-the-Rise-of-Global-Internet-Governance.
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process, is said to have threatened Postel with criminal charges unless he
rescinded that direction.' 7
The U.S. government won that round; Postel withdrew his direction.
And the government was similarly able to beat back the challenge from
IAHC by directing NSI to decline to make the changes in the root zone that
would be needed to implement the IAHC plan.'" But these were assertions
of government authority made in the course of the U.S. government's pro-
fessed "privatization." The key move in the creation of today's Internet
governance structure, thus, was not the abdication of U.S. government au-
thority, but its assertion at a time when that authority was highly contested.
As Sebastian Botzem and Jeanette Hofmann have put it, "the U.S. govern-
ment imposed public authority onto a largely self-regulatory structure with
the official objective of privatizing it"-a move whose "inherent contradic-
tion became obvious" shortly afterwards.' 9
It's not really surprising that the U.S. government should have sought to
impose its own authority over Internet addressing. Government decision-
makers, after all, thought the domain-name and IP-address system was im-
portant, and wanted to set it on what they deemed to be the best possible
institutional and policy footing. The U.S. government thus established an
interagency working group in 1997 to consider domain name policy, passed
that group's work product to Magaziner for further consultations and devel-
opment, and after a long slog finally succeeded in seeing a modified version
of that policy reflected in ICANN's founding documents.2 0
The resulting structure, while setting out a strong ICANN policy-
making role, also gave the U.S. government the opportunity to exercise ex-
tensive authority.2' Especially at the outset, ICANN was highly dependent
on U.S. government support in its battles to exercise authority, in particular
over NSI. As Stuart Lynn, ICANN's then-CEO, put it in 2002: "[E]ach of
ICANN's accomplishments to date have all depended, in one way or anoth-
er, on government support, particularly from the United States." 22 Moreover,
17. See id. at 55 (Postel backed down facing "threats made in the name of the US Gov-
ernment"); Froomkin, supra note 6, at 64-65; see also MUELLER, Supra note 6, at 161-62;
Weinberg, supra note 6, at 205 n.92.
18. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 205; see also MUELLER, supra note 6, at 158-59.
19. Sebastian Botzem & Jeanette Hofmann, Transnational Governance Spirals: The
Transformation of Rule-Making Authority in Internet Regulation and Corporate Financial
Reporting, 4 CRITICAL POL'Y STUD. 18, 18-37 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1706177; see also Feld, supra note 14, at 361 ("ICANN repre-
sented a step away from privatization to a regulated regime.").
20. See generally Weinberg, supra note 6.
21. Botzem & Hofmann have referred to the resulting institution as displaying a "hy-
bridization of private and public authority." Botzem & Hofmann, supra note 19, at 21.
22. President's Report: ICANN-The Case for Reform, ICANN (Feb. 24, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.icann.org/en/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm. He continued:
US government help was critical to obtaining ICANN's first registry agreements
[with NSI]. All the other agreements that ICANN has achieved have depended, ul-
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the U.S. government retained a veto over any ICANN action pertaining to
the contents of the root zone. As a practical matter, then, during ICANN's
formative period, the U.S. government was first on the list of actors that
ICANN simply could not afford to antagonize.
Law professor A. Michael Froomkin, not long after ICANN's for-
mation, argued that ICANN's founding documents and initial practice gave
the U.S. government the power to veto essentially all of its decisions.23 The
U.S. Department of Commerce, he continued, had so much control over
ICANN's operations as to make its failure to countermand any ICANN de-
cision reviewable in federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act. 24
While no court adopted this view, the very fact that it could be plausibly
argued demonstrates the symbiotic connections between the two bodies.
What about ICANN's relationship with other national governments?
ICANN's founding documents contemplated only a weak informal advisory
role for those governments, via a body called the Government Advisory
Committee (GAC). 25 The GAC was made up of a single representative from
each of the national governments that chose to send one. It was there to pro-
vide an informal mechanism for governments to communicate their views to
ICANN on matters that concerned them; it had no role other than that of
giving advice that might or might not be heeded. 26
In ICANN's early years, the GAC did not play a wide-ranging role. No
more than thirty governments, all from more-developed countries, took the
trouble to participate.27 For the most part, it confined its attentions to matters
of interest to governments in their institutional capacities, such as the rela-
tionship of national governments to the country code top-level domains
(ccTLDs), such as .fr and .uk, assigned to entities within each country.28
timately, on the willingness of the US government to make it clear ... that it was
not receptive to changes in the authoritative root zone file that were not managed
through the ICANN process.
23. See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 111.
24. See id. at 125-38.
25. See Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN
(Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://www.icann.org/en/generallarchive-bylaws/bylaws-
06nov98.htm#VII (ICANN's original 11/6/98 bylaws, providing for a Government Advisory
Committee, composed of representatives of national governments, to "consider and provide
advice on [ICANNI activities . . . as they relate to concerns of governments," and committing
the ICANN Board, after putting a proposal out for public comment, to "consider any [GAC]
response ... prior to taking action").
26. See id.
27. See Wolfgang Kleinwaxchter, From Self-Governance to Public-Private Partner-
ship: The Changing Role of Governments in the Management of the Internet's Core
Resources, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1103, 1116 (2003).
28. See Paul Twomey, Governmental Advisory Committee Commentary on the Names
Council Resolution, ICANN (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.icann.org/
en/committees/gac/names-council-resolution-commentary-26octOl.htm; Principles for Dele-
gation and Administration of ccTLDs, ICANN (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.
icann.org/en/committees/gac/gac-cctldprinciples-23febOO.htm.
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Although Jon Postel had delegated authority to run most ccTLDs to non-
governmental entities, national governments historically had thought of the
ccTLDs as "belonging" to them; the question of national-government au-
thority over the ccTLDs had been a matter of contention for years. 29
The GAC also focused on the registrability of country names and codes
as domain names, and on the development of so-called "internationalized"
domain names-that is, domain names using other than English-language
characters, a matter taken seriously by governments whose official lan-
guages used such characters. 30 It paid little attention to most other issues
within ICANN's scope.3 1
There was a reason the GAC had no formal role in the ICANN policy
process: the rhetoric of privatization demanded it. The initial ICANN struc-
ture deliberately cut world governments out of the policy development
process. The United States government, overseeing that process, saw its
agenda as "support[ing] the efforts of private sector organizations to develop
mechanisms to facilitate the successful operation of the Internet." 32
ICANN's framers contemplated, and its bylaws enshrined, an elaborate pol-
icy process in which a wide range of interested private parties would
together, in working groups and otherwise, craft a policy that could be pre-
sented to the Board as a purported community consensus. World
governments weren't to be part of that bottom-up deliberative process. In-
stead, the ICANN bylaws set up separate channels for informal government
advice.
29. For example, in 1986 Postel delegated authority over .au to one Robert Elz, a net-
work engineer at the University of Melbourne. ICANN staff redelegated that authority in
2001, over Elz's objection, to an entity endorsed by the Australian government. See A. Mi-
chael Froomkin, How ICANN Policy is Made (II), ICANNWATCH (Sept. 5, 2001),
http://www.icannwatch.org/essays/dotau.htm; IANA Report on Request for Redelegation of
the .au Top-Level Domain, INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY (Aug. 31, 2001),
http://www.iana.org/reports/2001/au-report-3 1aug01.html.
30. See, e.g., Communiqud of the Governmental Advisory Committee, ICANN (Sept. 9,
2001), http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/communique-09sepO1.htm.
31. The GAC did issue one early statement on a broader matter. See Opinion of the
Governmental Advisory Committee on New Generic Top Level Domains, ICANN (Nov. 16,
2000), http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/new-td-opinion- I 6novOO.htm. Even in that
document, however, the most important points related to internationalized domain names and
restriction of the use of country names in domain names. Notwithstanding the expansion of
the GAC role that I note later in this Essay, an informed observer was able to write in 2010
that GAC "interventions in ICANN policy processes, almost without exception, have been to
claim special benefits or powers for its member governments." MILTON L. MUELLER, NET-
WORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 244 (Mass. Inst. of
Tech. ed., 2010).
32. Read the Framework, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/
Commerce/read.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). ICANN's bylaws explicitly barred govern-
ment officials from serving on the organization's board. See Bylaws for Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN (Nov. 6, 1998), http://www.icann.org/en/general/
archive-bylaws/bylaws-06nov98.htm#V.
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II. THE GAC's CHANGING ROLE
The era of strong, sustained U.S government involvement in ICANN
didn't last. Through the end of 1999, U.S. officials were deeply involved in
ICANN matters; they sought in particular to use their leverage over NSI to
overcome its disinclination to recognize ICANN authority. That dispute was
finally resolved with the signing of a set of new contracts at the end of 1999,
giving ICANN more nearly solid legal authority over NSI but assuring
NSI's commercial position.33
But U.S. government attention to ICANN waned. Ira Magaziner, who
more than anyone else in the U.S. government had brought ICANN into
being, left his government position in 1998.34 J. Beckwith Burr, who had
also been instrumental in ICANN's formation, left at the end of 2000.31 At
that point, ICANN policy was largely in the hands of a Department of
Commerce employee named Karen Rose, just five years out of college.36 it
is unclear how intimately Rose and her successors in the small Office of
International Affairs of the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration within the Department of Commerce were involved with
ICANN matters. Certainly they reacted to particular ICANN-related contro-
versies and were involved with the periodic reauthorization of ICANN's
Memorandum of Understanding. Rose lobbied ICANN on such matters as
its actions to bring about a centralized public "WHOIS" database containing
information identifying domain name registrants.37 But the folks who
worked in that small corner of the Commerce Department didn't have sup-
port from their superiors for ICANN involvement that would incur political
costs on the domestic U.S. front. Too-close, publicly-acknowledged in-
volvement in ICANN decision-making would be a source of political
controversy and headaches. From the perspective of the National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration, as one observer later put it,
"ICANN is a royal pain in the ass."38
As ICANN emerged from its first three years of existence, thus, while it
was sensitive to the desires of governments, it was not burdened by a need
to work with them too much. One could be forgiven for thinking that
ICANN staff, at this point in the organization's existence, would see ad-
33. See MUELLER, supra note 6, at 194-96.
34. See Jeri Clausing, Clinton's Envoy to the Internet Will Resign by Year's End, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 1998), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/09/business/clinton-s-
envoy-to-the-internet-will-resign-by-year-s-end.html.
35. See J. Beckwith Burr, WILMERHALE, http://www.wilmerhale.com/becky-burr (last
visited Sept. 29, 2011).
36. See Karen Rose's Experience, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/in/southemseas
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
37. See Letter from Karen Rose to Michael Roberts, ICANN CEO (Sept. 28, 2000),
available at http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/doc-to-icann-28sep00.htm.
38. E-mail from Harold Feld to author (July 6, 2009) (on file with the author) (quoted
with permission).
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vantages to this remove from day-to-day interaction with bureaucrats and
politicians. In fact, though, three years after ICANN was formed, ICANN's
CEO issued a call to action in which he identified the absence of systematic
government involvement in ICANN as a crucial-and likely fatal-flaw in
its structure.39 CEO Stuart Lynn saw three key challenges facing ICANN.
The first was the fact that it had not yet entered into the agreements it was
seeking with key domain name players-the various root server operators,
the regional IP address registries, and most of the ccTLD operators-
recognizing ICANN's authority and formalizing their interaction. The
second was what he characterized as ICANN's "unrealistic" and "Sisyphe-
an" preoccupation with finding a workable mechanism for public
representation and accountability. The third was a lack of funds.40
If national governments were more directly involved in ICANN, Lynn
reasoned, they would have greater incentive to pressure their ccTLDs to en-
ter into contracts with ICANN formally recognizing its authority.4 National
governments also could supply ICANN with funding it badly lacked; 42
ICANN could use some of that money to buy the cooperation of the root
server operators. 43 And, because national governments were in Lynn's words
"the most evolved and best legitimated representatives of their populations,"
they were the answer to any questions about ICANN's democratic legitima-
cy." In order to secure all of these benefits, and to get the buy-in that would
induce national governments to take these steps, Lynn proposed a new "pub-
lic-private" structure for ICANN, in which fully a third of its Board
members would be named directly by the GAC or by national govern-
ments.45
The "Board seats for governments" plan was not popular with ICANN's
various constituencies. Nongovernmental entities saw no basis for the
39. See Stuart Lynn, President's Report: ICANN-The Case for Reform, ICANN (Feb.
24, 2002), available at http://www.icann.org/en/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm.
40. See id.
41. See id. (bemoaning the fact that many ccTLD registries were "unwilling (despite all
the rational arguments and history to the contrary) to accept voluntarily the existence and
authority of a global coordinating entity," and explaining that by virtue of government in-
volvement in ICANN, those governments would "more effectively encourage" their ccTLDs'
participation).
42. See id. ("All of the participants in the ICANN process that have the ability to pay a
share of ICANN funding should do so. With 'skin in the game,' these participants will feel a
more immediate and direct connection to the success of the ICANN process. And this includes
governments.").
43. See id. ("[Wie must move to a system where the root server operators are compen-
sated for their critical services .... [W]e will ultimately need a more definitive and binding
set of arrangements with the current and any future root name server operators, and that will
require significantly greater funding than is presently available to ICANN.").
44. Id.
45. See id. The government-chosen Board members, however, would not themselves be
"governmental employees with policymaking responsibilities." Rather, governments would
select worthy private citizens for those Board seats.
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conclusion that giving governments a bigger ICANN role, and having them
provide more funding, would be an improvement.46 Governments appeared
no more enthusiastic. 4 A European Commission response suggested that
Lynn's proposal was a "radical redefinition of the relationship between the
public and private sector actors in the Internet," and emphasized the EU's
historic "support [of] the principle of private sector self-regulation."48 A let-
ter signed by the bipartisan leadership of the U.S. House Commerce
Committee and the relevant subcommittee urged that the overall effect of
Lynn's proposed changes would "make ICANN even less democratic, open,
and accountable than it is today."49 Governments may have seen little in the
proposal for them; after all, the benefit to any particular national govern-
ment of there being five people on the ICANN Board who had been selected
by the GAC, but who nonetheless likely hailed from some other nation,
wasn't great.
ICANN did, though, make key changes to its internal structure as a re-
sult of Lynn's initiative.5 0 The most important, for this Essay's purposes,
46. See, e.g., Alex Pawlik, Managing Director, RIPE NCC, The RIPE NCC Response to
the ICANN Reform Proposal Document, RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE (Mar.
2002), http://www.ripe.net/internet-coordination/news/announcements/the-ripe-ncc-response-
to-the-icann-reform-proposal-document ("Our experience shows that funding by governments
and other third parties often brings disadvantages for the organisation receiving the funds, as
there are usually direct or indirect strings attached. Funding should be provided by those using
ICANN's services.").
47. The GAC made no formal substantive statement relating to Lynn's initial proposal.
Cf Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud #12, ICANN (Mar. 11-12, 2002),
available at https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540200/GAC_12_Accra_
Communique.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1312230084000 ("[I]t would be premature to
comment on the most appropriate framework and structure for this private-public partnership
..... ). ICANN established a Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform to further develop
the proposal; that committee eventually dropped the idea of government selection of Board
members, while proposing that the GAC should appoint a nonvoting Board liaison. See
ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, ICANN (June 20, 2002), http://www.icann.org/en/
committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20junO2.htm. A majority of GAC members, while rejecting
the concept of governments funding the ICANN budget, supported the nonvoting liaison con-
cept. Governmental Advisory Comm., Statement on ICANN Reform, ICANN (June 26, 2002),
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26junO2.htm. France, Germany,
Spain, and Switzerland, however, criticized the presence of even a nonvoting GAC repre-
sentative on the Board, because "it would lead the GAC representative to deal with matters
which have no direct public interest implication, create difficulties in discussions about topics
where there is no GAC consensus, and be incompatible with GAC independence." Id.
48. Press Release, Europa, Telecom Council (Mar. 25, 2002), http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/02/65&format=HTML&aged=1 &language=EN&
guiLanguage=en.
49. Letter from W. J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, U.S. House Commerce Comm. et al.
to Donald L. Evans, Sec'y of Commerce (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.
icannwatch.orglarticle.pl?sid-02/03/14/122633&mode=thread.
50. They included a more robust and lucrative mechanism for getting funding from
domain name industry actors. That new mechanism proved crucial to ICANN's later success.
See Jonathan Weinberg, Non-State Actors and Global Informal Governance-The Case of
ICANN21 (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 10-05).
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was this: under the post-2002 rules, the GAC has free-wheeling authority
to "advise" the ICANN Board on public policy matters, and if the Board
chooses not to take GAC advice, its bylaws require that the Board and
GAC "try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to find a mu-
tually acceptable solution." If "no such solution can be found," the Board
is free to implement its preferred policy after explaining the reasons for its
choice.5 '
It's plausible that what many governments wanted most from ICANN at
the time, besides a greater degree of control over their local ccTLDs, was a
mechanism allowing them to step in and exert influence reactively, in case
ICANN seemed about to do something that threatened their interests 52-and
that's just what the strengthened GAC mechanism seemed designed to give
them.5
The 2002 bylaws change had little immediate operational effect. The
GAC's involvement in ICANN controversies continued to be episodic, reac-
tive, and peripheral. The GAC did establish six internal working groups in
2003, addressing a range of important issues. 54 But its involvement
For the amended bylaws that were the product of ICANN's self-designated 2002 "Evolu-
tion and Reform" process, see Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, ICANN (Dec. 15, 2002), available at http://www.icann.orgeni/generaUarchive-
bylaws/bylaws-15decO2.htm. For a scholarly symposium discussing the resulting changes, see
A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN 2.0: Meet the New Boss, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1087 (2003).
51. Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN (June
24, 2011), available at http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm#XI. The new rules also
gave the GAC a nonvoting Board liaison.
52. The GAC statement, supra note 47, emphasized that "government[s] . . . are re-
sponsible for public policy" and that the GAC's advice on public policy matters must be "duly
taken into account both at the policy-drafting and at the decision-taking stage." Governmental
Advisory Comm., Statement on ICANN Reform, ICANN (June 26, 2002),
http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26junO2.htm.
53. Michael Froomkin has argued that enhancing the role of the GAC in 2002 gave
ICANN important political advantages, both helping it to make friends outside the U.S. and
giving it a presence in commerce and trade-based ministries that could act as a counterweight
to communications ministries allied with the International Telecommunications Union. See
Froomkin, supra note 4, at 196.
It's also worth noting that Paul Twomey, who assumed the job of ICANN CEO in March
2003, had been an official of the Australian government and chair of the GAC until November
2002, when he stepped down to launch an advisory and investment firm. Some see Twomey's
CEO appointment as a product of ICANN's desire to have a "government person" at the helm
to address the threat posed by the World Summit on the Information Society. Kieran McCar-
thy, So what does that weird GAC wording actually mean?, KIEREN MCCARTHY [DOTCOM]
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://kierenmccarthy.com/2l11/01/27/so-what-does-that-weird-gac-wording-
actually-mean/.
54. The working groups addressed ccTLDs, internationalized domain names, generic
top-level domains, the security of the domain name system, IPv6 (a new system for distrib-
uting IP addresses that would impose substantial costs on large users), and WHOIS (that is,
the public availability of information identifying domain name registrants). See Governmental
Advisory Comm., Meeting 15: Rio De Janeiro, ICANN (Mar. 23-25, 2003), https://gacweb.
icann.org/download/attachments/1540182/GAC 16_Rio-deJaneiro Communique.pdf; see
also Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC WHOIS Working Group Discussion Paper,
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in the ICANN policymaking process before the summer of 2005 was infre-
quent.55
Two developments helped to shift the GAC's role. First, world govern-
ments were becoming more attuned to ICANN-related issues. Some of those
governments had grown frustrated with ICANN's U.S.-centrism, and others
with its status as an informal, private organization rather than an intergov-
ernmental body.56 The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a
United Nations forum bringing together representatives of government,
business, and civil society, became a focus for that frustration: a draft WSIS
Declaration of Principles in March 2003 urged that domain-name manage-
ment "must be multilateral, democratic and transparent, taking into account
the needs of the public and private sectors as well as those of the civil socie-
ty." To that end, it continued, ICANN's responsibilities "should rest with a
suitable international, intergovernmental organization.""
This was a naked challenge: ICANN is not an intergovernmental organ-
ization. The International Telecommunications Union is, and some
developing country governments would have preferred to see ICANN sup-
planted by the ITU. It was never plausible, though, that the WSIS process
would end with a decision that ICANN should be ousted of its authority.5 8
WSIS ended with no more than an agreement to create a new venue in
which participants would continue to discuss Internet governance. That ven-
ue was named the Internet Governance Forum; its discussions have posed no
challenge to ICANN authority.59
ICANN (June 22, 2003), http://www.icann.org/en/committees/gac/whois-discussion-paper-
22junO3.htm.
55. See GAC Communiquds for Meetings 1-22, archived at https://gacweb.icann.org/
display/gacweb/GAC+Meetings+Archive (revealing only infrequent involvement). It appears that
the GAC's only significant attempts to influence ICANN policy from mid-2003 to mid-2005
related to ccTLDs (the GAC in April 2005 adopted a new version of its principles for ccTLD
delegation and administration) and WHOIS (including some lobbying for speedy law enforce-
ment access to WHOIS data). See Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud -
Luxembourg, ICANN (July 9-12, 2005), https://gacweb.icann.org/downloadlattachments/
1540184/GAC_23_Luxembourg.pdf~version=I &modificationDate=l 312229243000.
56. See Weinberg, supra note 50, at 14-16. See generally MUELLER, supra note 31, at
55-80 (describing the origins of the World Summit on the Information Society).
57. World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, Draft Declaration of Principles, at 5, Doc.
WSIS/PCIP/DT/1-E (Mar. 21, 2003), http://www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-s/md/03/wsispcip/td/
03072 1/SO3-WSISPCIP-03072 I -TD-GEN-0001!!MSW-E.doc.
58. No First World country supported ICANN's ouster. The European Union did ex-
press support for a greater role for governments in high-level policymaking concerning
Internet names and numbers, but emphasized the need to "build on the existing structures of
Internet Governance" rather than replacing them. World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, Proposal
for Addition to Chair's Paper Sub-Com A Internet Governance on Paragraph 5 "Follow-up
and Possible Arrangements," at 1, Doc. WSIS-ll/PC-3/DT/21-E (Sept. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/working/dt2 I.pdf.
59. See Milton Mueller, The IGF and the Internet Society-ITU Rivalry, THE INTERNET
GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Nov. 20, 2009, 4:38 PM), http://blog.intemetgovernance.org/blog/
archives/2009/11/20/4385849.html (describing the influence of ICANN supporters, includ-
ing the Internet Society, within the IGF).
200 [Vol. I8:189
ICANN and the GAC
At the same time, the WSIS process helped shift the conventional wis-
dom about Internet governance in a way that contributed to a change in the
GAC's role. One of the challenges to ICANN's authority mediated by WSIS
was a claim that ICANN was making public policy decisions that rightfully
should be made only by governments; ICANN's defenders pushed back
with a "multistakeholder" model60 in which governments had a legitimate
role to play in the governance process, mediated through ICANN, along
with other "stakeholder" groups.6'
It's important to grasp the rhetorical shift that took place here. The lan-
guage of ICANN's founding contemplated governance by multiple Internet
"stakeholders"; the White House, thus, described ICANN as "formed by
private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet
name and address system."62 But those "stakeholders," as the White House
language reveals, were all from the private sector. The new "multistakehold-
erism," by contrast, saw Internet name and address policy as the product of
discussions among governments together with business and civil society.63
The final WSIS document (the "Tunis Agenda") made plain that gov-
ernments-along with "the private sector, civil society and international
organizations"-should be fully involved in the international management
of the Internet.' It characterized "authority for Internet-related public policy
issues" as "the sovereign right of States."16 It referenced "multistakehold-
erism" more than a dozen times,66 institutionalizing a new way of
conceiving the government role in ICANN, and laid the foundation for a
greater role for governments in ICANN via the GAC.67
All of this took place on the level of diplomat-speak and theory, though;
it took concrete events to move the story along. They began in the spring of
2004, when a private entity called ICM Registry proposed to establish an
.xxx top-level domain, "intended primarily to serve the needs of the global
60. See, e.g., World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,
[ 37, 41, 67, 72, 73, 78, 83, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105, 108, 110, Doe. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/
6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6revl .html.
61. See MUELLER, supra note 31, at 69.
62. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 12, at 31,749.
63. The term was already in use in certain other contexts. See, e.g., Joel Reidenberg,
Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1315, 1358-59 (2000) (describing a "multistakeholder approach" as one in which "national
governments ... have an ongoing dialog with all stakeholders, including industry and privacy
advocacy groups as well as independent experts and scholars").
64. World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, supra note 60, [ 29.
65. Id. 135.
66. Seeid. $ 1-122.
67. See MUELLER, supra note 31, at 77-78. I am indebted to Fiona Alexander for em-
phasizing this point to me.
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online adult-entertainment community."68 In June 2005, the ICANN Board
voted to approve that proposal. 69 Controversy followed.70
National governments had not been engaged with the .xxx issue before
the ICANN decision. Indeed, a letter from GAC chair Mohamed Sharil
Tarmizi just two months before stated that "[n]o GAC members have ex-
pressed specific reservations or comments" about any of the pending top-level
domain applications." Once the decision was made, though, representatives
of a variety of national governments used the GAC forum to express their
concern.7 2 The U.S. government was not among the objectors initially; at first,
it sought to minimize complaints in the GAC, suggesting that they should
have been made earlier.73 But within ten weeks, following campaigns against
the decision by such organizations as the Family Research Council and Focus
on the Family, the U.S. government came to play a leading role in opposition
to the .xxx domain. 74
There followed letters expressing concern about, or seeking reconsider-
ation of, ICANN's decision on .xxx from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, the chair of the GAC, and the governments of Australia, the
68. New sTLD RFP Application, ICANN (Mar. 19, 2004), http://www.icann.org/en/
tlds/stld-apps-19marO4/xxx.htm.
69. In form, the Board's resolution merely authorized ICANN staff to enter into con-
tract negotiations with ICM. See Special Meeting of the Board Minutes, ICANN (June 1,
2005), http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/minutes-OljunO5.htm; see also Joi Ito, Some Notes on
the XXX Top-Level Domain, CIRCLEID (June 2, 2005, 6:07 PM), http://www.circleid.
com/posts/somenotes onthe-xxx.topjleveldomain. An arbitration panel, however, later
found that the Board's June 2005 vote definitively resolved that ICM met the selection criteria
and was entitled to the domain, after completing contract negotiations relating to commercial
and technical details. See ICM Registry v. ICANN, Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08, at 64-69
(Int'l Ctr. for Dispute Resolution Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.icann.org/
en/irp/icm-v-icann/irp-panel-declaration-19febI0-en.pdf.
70. For a detailed retelling of the xxx story, see The Berkman Centr. for Internet &
Soc'y at Harvard Univ., Accountability and Transparency at ICANN, ICANN (Dec. 31, 2010),
http://www.icann.org/en/reviews/affirmation/atrt-review-berkman-final-report-200ct10-
en.pdf; see also MUELLER, supra note 31, at 71-73.
71. See Correspondence from GAC Chairman to the ICANN CEO, ICANN (Apr. 3,
2005), available at http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/tarmizi-to-twomey-03aprO5.htm.
72. See ICM Registry, Case No. 50 117 T 00224 08 at I 1-14.
73. See id. at I1, 13 (summarizing GAC minutes and communiqu6). "USA remarked
that GAC had several [earlier] opportunities to raise questions.. . . USA thought that it would
be very difficult to express some views at this late stage. The process had been public since
the beginning, and the matter could have been raised before at Plenary or Working group
level." Id.
74. See id. at 16. Events of that ten-week period also included President Bush's ap-
pointment of a new Deputy Secretary of Commerce. See MILTON MUELLER, .XXX Puzzle
Pieces Start to Come Together: And the Picture is Ugly, CIRCLEID (Aug. 17, 2005, 9:16AM),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/xxx-puzzle-pieces-starttocomejtogetherand-the picture-i
s_ugly. A useful history of the U.S. government's response can be found in the Review of
Documents Released under the Freedom of Information Act in the XXX Case, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE PROJECT (May 16, 2006), available at http://intemetgovemance.org/pdf/xxx-
foia.pdf. For more on the FOIA litigation, see generally ICM Registry v. Dep't of Commerce,
538 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008).
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United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Brazil, as well as the Deputy Direc-
tor-General of the European Commission.15 After further rounds of debate,
with the GAC weighing in at all stages, ICANN ended up withdrawing its
approval.7 6 National governments had become involved with the issue late in
the day, but their objections were powerful.
The .xxx incident had two important consequences. First, ICANN had
earlier agreed that an international arbitration tribunal would have jurisdic-
tion to hear certain challenges to its decisions." 1CM Registry sought review
of ICANN's decision. The review panel ruled that ICANN's about-face on
.xxx after the blossoming of U.S. and GAC objections "was not consistent
with the application of neutral, objective and fair documented policy," and
therefore violated its obligations." While the panel's authority was only
advisory, the ICANN Board accepted its findings, and in 2011 formally ap-
proved the domain's inclusion in the root.79
Second, as part of its campaign against the xxx domain, the United
States had encouraged GAC members to weigh in, individually and as an
organization, to exert such influence as they could in the ICANN arena.s0
Empowered by that experience, GAC members sought to make their views
known more broadly. Most immediately, the .xxx experience led the GAC to
develop a set of Principles for New Top Level Domains. This document
spoke to the process for adding any new "generic" top-level domain
(gTLD), which in ICANN's taxonomy meant any top-level domain that was
not a ccTLD identified with a particular country. An early version of the
75. See ICM Registry, supra note 69, at 14-18; Letter from Marcelo de Carvalho
Lopes, Sec'y of Info. Tech. Pol'y, Brazil, to Mohamed Sharil Tarmizi, GAC Chair (Sept. 6,
2005), available at http://www.icann.org/en/correspondencellopez-to-tarmizi-06sep05.pdf.
76. See ICM Registry, supra note 69, at 22-31.
77. See Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN
(June 24, 2011), available at http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm.
78. See 1CM Registry, supra note 69, at 69-70.
79. See Approval of 1CM Registry Application for XXX, ICANN (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-I8marl 1-en.htm#5. The GAC in 2011 released a
communiqu6 noting the "emphatic[]" opposition of some member governments to .xxx ap-
proval. See Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - San Francisco, ICANN
(Mar. 18, 2011), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540152/GAC40San
FranciscoCommunique.pdf. The communiqu6 further noted "concerns expressed by experts"
that actions by those governments to block the .xxx TLD could pose "a potential risklthreat to
the universal resolvability and stability of the DNS," as well as concerns that the xxx registry
operator's commitments to police the domain could move ICANN in the direction of "an on-
going management and oversight role regarding Internet content." The ICANN Board, finding
in light of the arbitration decision that the domain application had met all relevant require-
ments, dismissed those concerns as inconsequential. 18 March 2011 Draft Rationale for
Approving Registry Agreement with 1CM's.XXX sTLD, ICANN (Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/draft-icm-rationale- I 8marl1 -en.pdf.
80. See MUELLER, supra note 31, at 72-73 (stating that U.S. officials requested GAC
chair Tarmizi to send a letter expressing member governments' discomfort with xxx, because
the U.S. saw GAC pressure on the ICANN Board as less politically damaging than unilateral
U.S. pressure); The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 104-05.
203Fall 2011]1
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
GAC Principles contemplated a powerful governmental role in the process
of adding new gTLDs: it would have given any GAC member an effective
veto over any proposed gTLD name.8' The completed version of the
Principles, in 2007, eliminated that veto, but it incorporated other directions
covering the gamut of domain name policymaking concerns. gTLD names,
they enjoined, should respect human rights, human dignity, and equality.
They should not infringe "sensitivities regarding terms with national, cultur-
al, geographic and religious significance." ICANN should avoid
geographical names or descriptions of geographical languages or peoples,
except with the permission of the relevant governments. There must be a
procedure for blocking, "at no cost and on demand of governments," indi-
viduals or firms from registering any second-level "names with national or
geographical significance" within the domain. 82
The GAC began to express its views more actively in areas other than
those involving ccTLDs and new gTLDs. It intensified its involvement with
WHOIS policy 83 and internationalized domain names.84 It worked to im-
81. See Draft GAC Guidelines on gTLDs, ICANN (Oct. 17, 2010), available at
http://forum.icann.orglists/gtld-council/msg00307.htm ("If the GAC or individual GAC
members express formal concerns about a specific new gTLD application, ICANN should
defer from proceeding with the said application until GAC concerns have been addressed to
the GAC's or the respective government's satisfaction."); see also MUELLER, supra note 31,
at 202-03. The same document directed ICANN to bar any top-level domain name that "pro-
mote[d] hatred, racism, discrimination of any sort, criminal activity or any abuse of specific
religions or cultures"; barred top-level domain names of "cultural" or "religious" significance
unless the domain were sponsored by a "clear and legitimate candidate" and there were no
"major objections from the community concerned"; and barred any top-level domain names
identical to geographic names, absent the approval of the relevant national government. Draft
GAC Guidelines at §§ 2.1, 2.6, 2.12.
82. See GAC Principles Regarding New gTLDs, ICANN (Mar. 28, 2007), available at
http://gac.icann.org/system/files/gTLD-principles_0.pdf. A "second-level domain name" is
the dot-delimited text string immediately to the left of the top-level name-such as "wayne"
in www.wayne.edu.
83. See GAC Principles Regarding gTLD WHOIS Services, ICANN (Mar. 28, 2007),
available at https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540132/WHOIS-principles.pdf;
Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - Los Angeles, ICANN (Oct. 31, 2007),
https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540191/GAC_30 LosAngelesCommunique.
pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1312228082000; Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC
Communiqud - Lisbon, ICANN (Mar. 28, 2007), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/
attachments/I 540189/GAC 28_LisbonCommunique.pdfversion= I &modificationDate=
1312228620000; Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - Marrakech, ICANN
(June 28, 2006), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540176/GAC_26_Marrakech_
Communique.pdfversion=1 &modificationDate= 1312228846000; Milton Mueller & Mawaki
Chango, Disrupting Global Governance: The Internet WHOIS Service, ICANN, and Privacy, 5 J.
INFo. TECH. & POL. 303, 319-20 (2008).
WHOIS presented a tricky issue. While governments supported law enforcement access
to the relevant information, some WHOIS requirements were inconsistent with European
privacy laws. See ICANN Procedure for Handling WHOIS Conflicts with Privacy Law,
ICANN (Jan. 17, 2008), http://www.icann.org/en/processes/icann-procedure- I 7janO8.htm.
84. See supra text accompanying note 30; see, e.g., Governmental Advisory Comm.,
GAC Communiqud - Nairobi, ICANN (Mar. 10 2010), http://nbo.icann.org/meetings/
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prove its working methods, and to become better integrated into ICANN
policy development, so that it could operate proactively rather than reactive-
ly." It announced a plan for a more robust secretariat to enable it to work
better outside of its thrice-annual meetings.86
Most importantly, the GAC became much more closely involved with
ICANN's ongoing effort to define permissible top-level domain names go-
ing forward." It addressed narrow concerns-pushing for the exclusion
from the generic top-level domain name space of anything that could be
seen as representing a geographical name 88-but also broader ones, playing
a crucial role in ICANN's more general rethinking of how best to avoid con-
troversial gTLD names.89 In 2009, the GAC began expressing a newfound
skepticism about whether new gTLDs were desirable at all; 90 in 2010, it
nairobi20O0/presentation-gac-soac-reports-12marl0-en.pdf; Governmental Advisory Comm.,
GAC Communiqud - Sydney, ICANN (June 24, 2009), http://www.umic.pt/images/stories/
Sydney%20communique%2OvFINAL.pdf; Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communi-
qud - Mexico City, ICANN (Mar. 4, 2009), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/
154015 1/GAC_34_MexicoCityCommuniqueEnglish.pdf?version= I &modificationDate= 1
311372132000; Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - New Delhi, ICANN
(Feb. 13, 2008), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540190/GAC_31
NewDelhiCommunique.pdf?version= 1 &modificationDate= 1312227981000; Governmental
Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - San Juan, ICANN (June 28, 2007), https://gacweb.
icann.org/download/attachments/I 540188/GAC_29_SanJuan.pdfversion=1 &modification
Date=1312228402000.
85. See Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - Marrakech, ICANN,
5-10 (June 28, 2006), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540176/GAC_26
MarrakechCommunique.pdfversion= I &modificationDate= 1312228846000.
86. See ICANNIGAC Secretariat Hybrid Model Set Up, ICANN (June 19, 2010),
http://brussels38.icann.org/meetings/brussels2010/presentation-gac-hybrid-models-19junl0-
en.pdf; Maria Farrell, Internet's Government Advisory Committee is Raising Its Game, MARIA
FARRELL (Mar. 11, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://mariafarrell.com/?p=65#more-65.
87. See, e.g., Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - Los Angeles,
ICANN (Oct. 31, 2007), https://gacweb.icann.org/downloadlattachments/1540191/GAC
30_LosAngelesCommunique.pdf; Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud-
Paris, ICANN (June 26, 2008), https://gacweb.icann.org/downloadlattachments/
1540187/GAC_32_ParisCommunique.pdf; Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Commu-
niqud -Sydney, ICANN (June 24, 2009), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/
1540154/GAC_35_SydneyCommunique.pdf.
88. See, e.g., Janis Karklins, Governmental Advisory Comm. Chairman, Re: GAC
Comments on New gTLDs and DAG v3, ICANN (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.icann.org/
en/correspondence/karklins-to-dengate-thrush- 10mar0 -en.pdf.
89. See Milton Mueller, ICANN and GAC discuss censorship, INFO. POL'Y (June 25,
2010), http://www.i-policy.org/2010/06/icann-and-gac-discuss-censorship.html; Monika Er-
mert, More Delay to ICANN Introduction of New Internet Domains?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(June 23, 2010, 7:49 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/06/23/more-delay-to-icann-
introduction-of-new-internet-domains.
90. See Letter from Janis Karklins, Governmental Advisory Comm. Chairman, to Peter
Dengate Thrush, ICANN Board Chairman (Aug. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/karklins-to-dengate-thrush-18augO9-en.pdf. There is
an "urgent need," the GAC continued, "for economic studies to be concluded which assess
whether the benefits of new gTLDs are likely to outweigh ... costs." Governmental Advisory
Comm., GAC Communiqud - Nairobi, ICANN, 8 (Mar. 20, 2010), https://gacweb.icann.org/
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began lobbying for new mechanisms privileging the rights of trademark
owners in the context of any new TLD rollout.91 It was clear by 2010 that
the GAC had become much more openly involved in policy discussions and
had come to demand a much more important role in the ICANN process. 92
The GAC's internal functioning is still a mystery to outsiders-it is typ-
ically unclear how members' views are aggregated in constructing GAC
policy positions. Its initiatives seem to be driven by a relatively small num-
ber of actors. 93 The United States, Canada, and the EU are said to be the
GAC's leading players; the rise of the GAC may thus represent no more
than a shift from authority centered on the United States to authority shared
within an Atlantic alliance. Indeed, some suggest that "the US calls the shots
in GAC" and that other governments, including the EU, can do no more than
make "minor modifications to U.S. initiatives."94 But the GAC has shown
itself recently to be both effective and influential.
I should note here ICANN's and the U.S. government's execution in
September 2009 of a document they called an "Affirmation of Commit-
ments."95 With that document, the U.S. government and ICANN ended a set
of contractual obligations running between them since 1998; the U.S. gave
up what amounted to a contractual right to assign the ICANN function to
some other entity. The Affirmation, for the most part, is a symbolic docu-
ment,96 but it does expand the role of the GAC in one important way: it
download/attachments/1 540146/GAC_37_NairobiCommunique.pdf?version= I&
modificationDate=1312226773000.
91. See Kevin Murphy, Trademarks May Delay New TLD Approval, DOMAIN INCITE
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.domainincite.com/trademarks-may-delay-new-tld-approval.
92. See, e.g., Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud - Mexico City,
ICANN, 13 (Dec. 22, 2008), https://gacweb.icann.org/download/attachments/1540151/
GAC_34_MexicoCityCommunique English.pdf?version= I &modificationDate=131137213
2000 ("[W]hen it comes to public policy parameters that need to be incorporated into
[ICANN] policymaking, the expertise and competence lies with the GAC.").
93. See Milton Mueller, Competition Policy Letters to ICANN Part of a US-EC "Plot,"
INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (June 19, 2011, 5:11 AM), http://blog.
internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/6/19/4841358.html; Jamal Shahin & Matthias
Finger, ICANN's GAC and the Global Governance of the Internet: The Role of the EU in
Bringing "Government" Back to Internet Governance 19 (Dec. 2, 2008), http://mir.epfl.ch/
webdav/site/mir/users/181931/public/wp0902.pdf; see also Kieran McCarthy, EU Confirms
High-Level Meeting with US Government Over ICANN, .NXT (May 11, 2011),
http://news.dot-nxt.com/2011/05/11/kroes-strickling-meeting (characterizing the GAC as
"dominated by the US and EU representatives").
94. Milton Mueller, GAC Backs Off TLD Censorship a Bit. But Not Enough., INTERNET
GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2011, 12:27 PM), http://blog.internetgovernance.org/
blog/_archives/2011/2/24/4757553.html.
95. Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department of Commerce and the
Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN (Sept. 30, 2009), http://
www.icann.org/en/documents/affirmation-of-commitments-30sep09-en.htm.
96. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 190-207. The U.S. government retained its authori-
ty over changes to the root zone file, and one should not imagine that the Affirmation
manifests a sharp change in the U.S.-ICANN relationship. As I will detail in the next section,
the U.S. government has been assertive, post-Affirmation, in pressing its views on ICANN.
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mandates periodic reviews of ICANN and its policies, and gives the GAC a
lead role in constituting the review teams. 97
All is not sweetness and light, though, for proponents of greater gov-
ernment influence in ICANN deliberations. The GAC's new assertion of
authority and its flexing of muscle have outstripped the institutional forms
in place to accommodate it. A recent internal review of ICANN processes
described the relationship between the ICANN Board and the GAC as "dys-
functional." 8 I'll explain why in the next section.
III. THE GAC IN THE POLICY PROCESS
ICANN constituted an Accountability and Transparency Review Team
(ATRT) in 2010, tasked with evaluating its mechanisms for public input,
accountability, and transparency.99 The ATRT saw much to improve in the
relationship between ICANN's Board and the GAC. Some of the difficulties
in that working relationship, it found, lie in the long period of time that
sometimes must pass before the GAC can take a public position. For one
thing, GAC members may need time-consuming consultations with their
own national governments before negotiating with other GAC members. For
another, the GAC itself meets only three times a year, and it is still develop-
ing its capacity to work between sessions. 00
But the ATRT report concluded that the difficulties go far beyond the
GAC's internal workings. The report focused on an ambiguity in ICANN's
bylaws as to what constitutes GAC "advice" triggering the bylaws require-
ment that ICANN "try, in good faith and in a timely and efficient manner, to
find a mutually acceptable solution."10 ' GAC members had taken the posi-
tion that any communication emanating from that body-a position paper, a
letter from the chair, or a meeting communiqud summarizing member
See infra text accompanying notes 122-132; see e.g., Letter from Lawrence Strickling, Assis-
tant Sec'y for Communications and Info., Dep't of Commerce, to Rod Beckstrom, ICANN
CEO (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://forum.icann.org/lists/5gtld-guide/pdf3Ep9MhQVGQ.pdf.
97. See MUELLER, supra note 31, at 249-50; Avri Doria, Post JPA-tempered happi-
ness, RANDOM THOUGHTS (Sept. 30, 2009), http://avri.doria.org/post/201173236/post-jpa-
tempered-happiness.
98. Final Recommendations of the Accountability and Transparency Review Team,
ICANN, 37 (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.icann.org/en/reviews/affirmation/atrt-final-
recommendations-31decl0-en.pdf [hereinafter, ATRTReport].
99. The ATRT was part of the review mechanisms mandated by the Affirmation of
Commitments.
100. See A TRT Report, supra note 98, at 37; see also The Berkman Centr. for Internet &
Soc'y, supra note 70, at 78-79. The Berkman Center report-which was generated as part of
the ATRT process, and was attached as an exhibit to the ATRT report-thus notes the chal-
lenges posed by "disparate organizational culture, the challenges of aligning internal processes
across multiple institutions, and complex cross-community communication mechanisms." The
Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 46.
101. See A TRT Report, supra note 98, at 3, 30-31, 35, 37. See generally supra text ac-
companying note 51 (discussing the ICANN bylaws).
Fall 201l] 207
208 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
views-constituted GAC "advice." ICANN Board members and staff, for
their part, disputed the notion that they were presumptively bound by the
views in GAC meeting communiquds, when the views noted in those com-
muniqu6s might not represent consensus or formally adopted GAC
positions, and indeed might not be internally consistent.'0 2
Moreover, the report noted, ICANN lacks a formal process for respond-
ing to GAC advice during the pendency of the policy development process.
The new generic top-level domain policy process involved a series of steps
in which ICANN staff issued tentative or draft documents, solicited public
comment, and then issued new iterations of the documents. The GAC pro-
vided comments, and found that while not all of its positions had been
incorporated in full in the new drafts, neither had the Board or staff formally
and explicitly rejected its views. This left GAC actors feeling as if they had
not been sufficiently listened to, and feeling that they had no choice but
simply to repeat their demands in the next round.'0 3
This begins to get us to the nub of the problem relating to the timing
and nature of GAC participation in the ICANN policy process. Neither
102. See ATRT Report, supra note 98, at 33, 37 (finding that there has likely been confu-
sion as to which GAC communications have triggered formal Board obligations). See also
The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 48 ("[Llack of discernable bound-
aries for channels of communication [during the .xxx controversy] caused confusion when
multiple GAC members submitted correspondence to the Board concurrently, often express-
ing conflicting views with prior advice or opinion.").
103. See ATRT Report, supra note 98, at 34 ("GAC members expressed concern that the
Board is not providing feedback to the GAC on the advice it does provide to the Board. One
GAC member commented that the GAC regularly has to repeat its advice in subsequent com-
muniquds because the Board does not supply any response to the GAC that it is taking the
GAC advice into account in its decision making."); The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y,
supra note 70, at 49 ("The lack of clear procedures for the timely acknowledgement of and
response to the range of GAC inputs by the Board may impede the policy development pro-
cess, as the GAC may feel compelled to restate its positions when it has not received a
sufficient response.").
In its October 2007 Communiqu6, the GAC expressed concerns that the GNSO
[(Generic Names Supporting Organization)] recommendations for new gTLDs did
not "properly take into account" the GAC principles regarding the use of country
names in new gTLDs. The GAC expressed this concern again in its June 2008, No-
vember 2008, March 2009, June 2009, October 2009 and March 2010
Communiques, as well as in letters on April 24 and August 18, 2009.
The second version of the DAG [(Draft Applicant Guidebook)], published on Feb-
ruary 19, 2009, required "evidence of support, or non-objections from the relevant
government or public authority" for applicants for geographic name-based gTLDs.
In communications to the Board after the publication of this draft of the DAG, the
GAC acknowledged that it was an improvement on the first version but that it did
not yet fully represent the GAC's views. In response, representatives of the Internet
Commerce Association demanded to know why ICANN had chosen the recom-
mendations of the GAC over those of the GNSO, in which geographic names were
given less protection.
The Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 80-81 (footnotes omitted).
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ICANN's initial bylaws,'" nor their 2002 reworking, contemplated that the
GAC would participate in "bottom-up" policy deliberations and argumenta-
tion. Instead, the GAC was to present its own advice directly to the Board.'0 5
This worked tolerably well so long as GAC involvement in ICANN policy-
making was minor.
As we have seen, though, over time the GAC shifted its focus. No long-
er an uninvolved body concerned with only a very narrow band of issues
seen as within its special jurisdiction, the GAC became aggressive, making
broad arguments reflecting the views of private lobbies on a wide range of
matters such as trademark protection. At the same time, the U.S. govern-
ment (especially after the signing of the Affirmation of Commitments)
channeled its own lobbying of ICANN into the GAC forum.
At that point the challenges of ICANN's structure became apparent.
That structure did not provide for any interaction "inside" the ICANN poli-
cy process between the GAC and other interested parties-the registrars,
say, or groups seeking to operate new top-level domains, or civil society
groups. The GAC interacted with the Board and only with the Board.
The initial guiding principle of the ICANN policy process was that pol-
icy would be crafted in subsidiary fora, and presented to the Board for
ratification only at the end of the process, when affected groups (not includ-
ing the GAC) had already thrashed out a solution. GAC advice pertained to
a consensus policy already presented to the Board, worked out and endorsed
by the various non-GAC policy actors. If the GAC's view were negative, it
would be seeking at the eleventh hour to squelch a proposal that had already
acquired momentum and support.
The process included no way to resolve conflicts between the GAC and
other participants, except through Board fliat. ICANN's Generic Names
Supporting Organization (GNSO), which brings together the various con-
stituencies that ICANN recognizes as having an interest in non-ccTLD
domain names, provides a mechanism through which those participants can
seek to work out their differences. But the GAC is not part of the GNSO
process. The ICANN structure channels GAC participation into its privi-
leged, separate route to the Board. If the Board declines to adopt the GAC's
position, the GAC feels that it has not been granted proper respect and
104. See Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, supra note
32, and accompanying text.
105. ICANN's 2002 rule changes rejected the earlier notion that the Board's only role
was to ratify community consensus after a policymaking process that took place elsewhere;
the organization recognized that consensus might not be possible on some issues, and the
Board would have to decide those issues anyway. See David R. Johnson et al., A Commentary
on the ICANN "Blueprint" for Evolution and Reform, 36 Lov. L. REV. 1127, 1146 (2003).
But the 2002 changes preserved-indeed embraced-the idea that in the typical situation,
proposals reaching the Board would be the product of an extensive policy process, at lower
levels of the organization, in which the various affected parties could work out their differ-
ences. And they contemplated that GAC involvement would take place only after that.
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deference; if the Board does adopt its position, other participants feel unfair-
ly squelched.' 06
IV. DANCING WITH ELEPHANTS
These limitations became clear in the past couple of years in connection
with ICANN's plan to reshape the way in which it adds new gTLDs to the
domain name space. ICANN's most important job at its creation was to
develop policy for the expansion of the domain name space.1o? Some argued
that ICANN should immediately authorize hundreds of new top-level do-
main names; that approach, they urged, would best advance competition,
innovation, and cultural diversity, allowing users and firms to decide which
TLDs they chose to register in. Others argued for only the barest expan-
sion.' ICANN in its first decade dropped in a small, restricted number of
new top-level domains, after scrutinizing and approving each one from a
business, financial, technical, and operational perspective. 09
ICANN began a policy process in 2006, though, that held the promise
of a much larger expansion of the domain name space."l0 Under the new
approach, ICANN wouldn't arbitrarily pick a few new gTLDs out of a large
pool of applications; rather, it would seek to establish objective criteria for
acceptable new gTLDs, and then grant all applications that met those crite-
ria. As the policy process moved along, it became clear that ICANN might
end up authorizing hundreds of new domains after all-a controversial
thing.
Starting in 2008, ICANN staff began collecting its procedural and sub-
stantive rules for the new gTLD-process-in-waiting in a document called the
"Draft Applicant Guidebook," or DAG."' The DAG went through seven
iterations, as part of a policy process spanning more than five years, involv-
106. See The Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, supra note 70, at 48.
107. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN, "Internet Stability," and the New Top Level Do-
mains, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: PROMISES, PROBLEMS,
PROSPECTS 3, 11 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Shane Greenstein eds., MIT Press 2002).
108. See the various arguments canvassed in Interim Report of Working Group C of the
Domain Name Supporting Organization, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers, GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORG. OF ICANN (Oct. 23, 1999), http://www.dnso.org/
dnso/notes/19991023.NCwgc-report.html.
109. From 1999 through 2010, ICANN approved a total of fourteen new gTLDs. See
Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), ICANN (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.icann.org/en/tids/ (.aero,
.asia, .biz, .cat, .coop, info, jobs, mobi, .museum, .name, pro, tel, travel); .POST Sponsored
TLD Agreement, ICANN (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/agreements/post/
(.post). For the story of the first seven, see Weinberg, supra note 107, at 11-20.
110. ICANN has been involved with the new-gTLDs issue for its entire existence, so
any starting date for this segment of the process is arbitrary. I am dating the process from
GNSO Initial Report: Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains, ICANN (Feb. 19,
2006), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/gnso-initial-rpt-new-gtds-19febO6.pdf.
11. See New gTLD Program: Draft Applicant Guidebook (Draft RFP), ICANN (Oct.
24, 2008), http://www.icann.orglen/topics/new-gtids/draft-rfp-24oct08-en.pdf.
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ing ICANN staff and subsidiary groups, on its way to ultimate Board ap-
proval in 2011. How was the GAC to involve itself in this process? It
wouldn't be well served by absenting itself entirely during all the years in
which the policy was being hammered out, and waiting for the result to be
presented to the Board. And the GAC, indeed, filed comments on successive
versions of the DAG.'1 2 But that badly fit the bylaws and earlier conceptions
of the GAC role, which had the GAC interacting with the Board, not with
ICANN staff. It was unclear just what ICANN was supposed to do when
staff declined to incorporate a GAC recommendation in the DAG's latest
iteration.
ICANN sought to bring the GAC into the policy process in 2010 by set-
ting up a "Cross-Community Working Group" (CCWG) in which GAC
members, GNSO representatives, and members of ICANN's At-Large Advi-
sory Committee (nominally representing individual Internet users) could
seek to work out a particular contested matter. But the approach didn't suc-
ceed, again because of ambiguity about the GAC's role in the process. To be
sure, the CCWG reached agreement on a set of policy recommendations,
and duly forwarded them to the Board." 3
But the U.S. government, in particular, wasn't satisfied with the
CCWG's resolution of the dispute. It floated a trial balloon urging the GAC
to reject the CCWG's conclusion and to transmit formal advice demanding
sweeping changes in the rules for authorization of new generic top-level
domains." 4 Under the proposal the U.S. government floated, any GAC
member would have been able to object to any gTLD name for any reason,
and-unless some other GAC member sought to countermand the objec-
tion-the objection would have been binding on the Board. U.S.
policymakers abandoned this proposal after criticism,"' but only intensified
their attempts-through the GAC-to exercise a veto at the very last stages
of the process.
In the last few months before the Board's adoption of its new gTLD
plan in June 2011, negotiations over the details of that plan gave a sense of
112. See, e.g., Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC Communiqud -Nairobi, Annex B,
ICANN, 7-9 (Mar. 10, 2010), nbo.icann.org/meetings/nairobi2010/presentation-gac-soac-
reports-I 2marlO-en.pdf.
113. See Report on Implementation of GNSO New GTLD Recommendation #6, ICANN
(Sept. 21, 2010), http://gnso.icann.org/issues/new-gtids/report-rec6-cwg-21sepl0-en.pdf;
Milton Mueller, Bye-bye, "Morality and Public Order," INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT
(Sept. 25, 2010, 9:02 AM), http:/fblog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2010/9/25/
4639200.html.
114. See USG Submission to the GAC Scorecard re New gTLDs, INTERNET GOVERN-
ANCE PROJECT, http:/Iblog.internetgovemance.org/pdflUSGmonstrosity.pdf (last visited Oct.
6,2011); Milton Mueller, The US Commerce Dept position paper for the ICANN Board nego-
tiations, INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Jan. 29, 2011, 1:11 AM), http://blog.
intemetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/1/29/4737705.html. The GAC had already ex-
pressed opposition to the CCWG's answers at an ICANN meeting at the end of 2010.
115. See Mueller, supra note 94.
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"all GAC, all the time." The March 2011 ICANN meeting was "completely
dominated by GAC-Board negotiations" over new top-level domains." 6
ICANN and the GAC released continually-updated "scorecards" character-
izing how far apart they were; the one ICANN drafted in advance of the
meeting tracked fifty-four identified issues."' The negotiations continued
after the meeting, and got more detailed. April 15 saw ICANN releasing a
"Revised ICANN Notes on the GAC New gTLDs Scorecard" that tallied
ICANN positions on eighty issues the GAC had raised. By that point,
ICANN explained, it had narrowed the dispute to seventeen issues of sub-
stantive disagreement and eighteen more of differences regarding
implementation, with three final questions marked "TBD.""5
The ICANN Board approved .xxx as a top-level domain at the March
2011 meeting;"l9 it thus made clear, had there been any doubt, that it was
willing to brush past GAC concerns. In mid-April 2011, ICANN released a
new version of its proposed rules for the new TLD rollout.120 It was plain
that its policy process was nearing an end, but its continuing discussions
with the GAC weren't eliminating all areas of disagreement. On a variety of
matters (Could top-level domain applicants modify their applications to
meet GAC objections? Could domain-name "registries" own domain-name
"registrars"? What sort of proof was necessary to trigger "uniform rapid
suspension" of a domain name at the behest of a trademark owner, and what
would be the consequences of a trademark holder's prevailing in such a pro-
ceeding? Under what circumstances could an entire new top level-domain
be revoked because of trademark infringement?), ICANN was signaling its
intention to proceed in the face of GAC disapproval.' 2 '
116. Milton Mueller, ICANN San Francisco: MuSH, GAC, MuSH!, INTERNET GOVERN-
ANCE PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2011, 5:25 PM), http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/
2011/3/17/4773838.html.
117. See GAC Sorted Scorecard, ICANN (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/
topics/new-gtids/gac-scorecard-sorted-14marI I-en.pdf.
118. Revised ICANN Notes on: the GAC New gTLDs Scorecard, and GAC Comments to
Board Response, ICANN (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/board-
notes-gac-scorecard-redline- 15apr1 I-en.pdf.
119. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Following that decision, the European
Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, went so far as to write to U.S. Secretary
of Commerce Gary Locke urging him to countermand ICANN's action; she suggested that
ICANN's disregard of national government objections in this context undermined "the legiti-
macy of the ICANN model." See Kevin Murphy, Europe Asked the US to Delay .xxx, DOMAIN
INCITE (May 5, 2011), http://domainincite.comleurope-did-ask-the-us-to-delay-xxx. The U.S.
government, however, declined to do so.
120. See gTLD Applicant Guidebook-April 2011 Discussion Draft, ICANN (Apr. 15,
2011), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft-rfp-redline-15aprl1-en.pdf.
121. ICANN, moreover, issued a warning about possible changes to the Board-GAC
relationship. On the one hand, the discussion draft stated, ICANN would apply a "strong pre-
sumption" against approving a top-level domain application if the GAC transmitted advice
labeled as "GAC consensus" recommending its rejection. The draft, however, continued:
"ICANN's transparency requirements indicate that GAC Advice on New gTLDs should
identify objecting countries, the public policy basis for the objection, and the process by
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The U.S. government urged that ICANN not go forward with new
gTLDs until its disagreements with the GAC were "resolved." 22 It warned
that ICANN needed to tend to its "political sustainability," expressing con-
cern that if foreign governments were not satisfied with ICANN's
attentiveness and deference to their views as expressed in the GAC, they
might withdraw their support for ICANN and favor transfer of its authority
to an international forum such as the ITU.123
The "political sustainability" concern seemed rhetorical and not well
founded. ICANN has consolidated its position in international and intergov-
ernmental fora: the 2010 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference ended in an
explicit recognition of ICANN's role.124 While there has been some (unsuc-
cessful) international pressure to transfer ICANN authority to the ITU, it has
come from developing countries and Russia, which have little ability to set
the agenda in the GAC.12 5 The governments that are most influential in the
GAC-which is to say, those that might be most angered by ICANN's rejec-
tion of GAC advice-are those of the United States and the EU, and those
governments have consistently rejected endowing the ITU or any other
which consensus was reached." Id. at § 3.1; see also New gTLD Program Explanatory Memo-
randum, ICANN (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-objections-
sensitive-strings-15apr 1-en.pdf. This direction, suggesting that ICANN would not defer to
advice that did not meet its procedural standards, was a challenge to the traditional opacity of
GAC advice, and to the ability of more influential GAC members to generate desired out-
comes behind the group's closed doors.
122. See Lawrence Strickling, Global Internet Governance Conference at the American
University School of International Service, ELLUMINATE (May 5, 2011), https://sas.
elluminate.com/p.jnlp?psid=2011-05-05.0606.M.12DFE0053934A528AAE4D38A76E4E0.
vcr&sid=2009293 (at 3:46:55).
123. Kieren McCarthy, USG 'Tough Love' Policy Toward ICANN Revealed, .NxT (June
25, 2011), http://news.dot-nxt.com/2011/06/25/strickling-board-meeting-cartagena; Kieren
McCarthy, USG to ICANN Board: Pull Your Head Out Your Ass, .NXT (Mar. 15, 2011),
http://news.dot-nxt.com/2011/03/14/usg-to-icann-board-head-out-of-ass; Milton Mueller,
@GigaNet: One Government's Opinion About Internet Governance, INTERNET GOVERNANCE
PROJECT (May 6, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/-archives/201I/
5/6/4811322.html; Milton Mueller, Commerce Department: "Foreign Devils Made Us Do It,"
INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2011, 11:12 AM), http://blog.internetgovernance.
org/blog/_archives/2011/3/7/4765678.html; Mueller, supra, note 113.
124. See Mueller, Commerce Department: "Foreign Devils Made Us Do It," supra, note
123; see also Kieren McCarthy, Last-Minute Diplomacy Secures ITU's Internet Future,
GLOBAL INTERNET BUS. COALITION (Oct. 25, 2010), http://gibc.biz/2010/10/last-minute-
diplomacy-secures-itu%E2%80%99s-intemet-future.
125. See Monika Ermert, UN And Internet Governance, Next Four Years: Better Coop-
eration Or Bigger Role?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/10/27/un-and-intemet-govemance-next-four-years-better-
cooperation-or-bigger-role; Eric Pfanner, Regulating the Internet in a Multifaceted World,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/technology/internet/27iht-
intemet27.html?_r-2&hpw.
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intergovernmental organization with Internet governance power.' 26 There is
no reason to think that they will change that position.127
U.S. government officials also were not shy, in May 2011 discussions of
the Board-GAC negotiations, to note that the United States had before it the
decision whether to renew ICANN's status as the entity performing the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) function.' 28 The "IANA func-
tion" includes a miscellany of tasks, one of which involves approving
changes in the root zone file that includes all Internet top-level domains. For
historical reasons, these tasks are carved off from ICANN's other activities,
and are performed by ICANN pursuant to a free-standing contract with the
U.S. government. That contract was due to expire on September 30, 2011;
ICANN wanted to see it extended on favorable terms.12 9 The unspoken link-
age was plain.
The U.S. government, indeed, on June 9 issued a Notice of Inquiry pro-
posing to use the IANA contract as a vehicle for a demand that ICANN
approve no new gTLDs without demonstrating that each new domain had
"received consensus support from relevant stakeholders and is supported by
the global public interest." 30 The proposal blithely ignored the fact that
IANA activities since 1999 have been entirely ministerial when it came to
gTLDs. It incorporated policy choices ICANN had rejected in preparing the
new gTLD program: the Applicant Guidebook's requirements for approval
of new TLDs required neither that applicants be able to show "consensus
support" nor that they make a specific showing that the domains advance the
global public interest.' 3 ' And in relying on the IANA contract as a means for
unilateral United States control over naming policy, the U.S. government
ignored the multilateralism that is its official policy in this arena.132
126. See Ermert, supra note 125.
127. See Communiqud on Principles for Internet Policy-Making, OECD, 4 (June 28-29,
2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/21/48289796.pdf (urging support for the existing
multi -stakeholder approach for Internet naming and numbering).
128. See, e.g., Strickling, supra note 122.
129. See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 192 n.15, 206-07.
130. Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,658,
34,665 (Dep't of Commerce June 14, 2011), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
frnotices/201 I/FRIANAFurtherNOI_0610201 1.pdf.
131. See Milton Mueller, NTIA's IANA Notice Contains Hidden Joke. Or Something.,
INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (June 13, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://blog.
intemetgovernance.org/blog/.archives/2011/6/13/4837428.html; Kevin Murphy, US Resur-
rects the Controversial New TLDs Veto, DOMAIN INCITE (June 11, 2011),
http://domainincite.com/us-revives-the-gac-new-tlds-veto. The Guidebook does require appli-
cants to show support from self-defined communities and to provide information on the
domain's expected benefits. See May 201l New gTLDApplicant Guidebook, ICANN
http://www.icann.orglen/topics/new-gtlds/comments-7-en.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
132. The IANA process is still ongoing. In the meantime, the U.S. government has ex-
tended the existing lANA contract to March 31, 2012. It seems unlikely, though, that this bid
will survive. It is too strongly in tension with the U.S. commitment to multilateralism reflect-
ed in documents including the Affirmation of Commitments.
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After a last-minute flurry of letters,'33 the ICANN Board approved the
new gTLD program on June 20, 2011. 134 It noted a variety of points where
it had rejected GAC positions.m1 5 European Commission official Neelie
Kroes responded by explaining that ICANN's "disregard [of] governmental
advice" pointed to "deficiencies in the current functioning of the model,"
and called for "specific actions in order to remedy the situation."l3 6
V. WHITHER THE GAC?
Even before the final stages of 2011's gTLD policy process, it was clear
that ICANN faced a structural problem: the GAC cannot both assume a fully
engaged role in the policy negotiation process and simultaneously have the
power of a presumptive veto at the end of the process. Other players in the
ICANN space will not be eager to negotiate, on an operational level, with an
entity that asserts its right later on to repudiate those negotiations from a
privileged position.
The GAC and ICANN thus face two key questions. The first relates to the
degree of influence the GAC will be able to exert in the ICANN policy devel-
opment process. In how broad a class of cases can the GAC, simply by virtue
of its opposition, block or reverse a policy resolution that would otherwise
have sufficient support to prevail in the multiplayer ICANN policy process?
133. See Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling to Peter Dengate Thrush, ICANN Board
Chairman (June 16, 2011), available at http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/strickling-to-
dengate-thrush-16junl I-en.pdf (forwarding a letter from James Tierney, U.S. Dep't of Justice
Chief); Letter from Gerard de Graaf, Dir. European Comm'n, and Linsey McCallum, Acting
Dir. European Comm'n, to Rod Beckstrom, ICANN CEO, and Peter Dengate Thrush, ICANN
Board Chairman (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.icann.org/en/correspondence/eu-to-
icann-17junl l-en.pdf.
134. ICANN had issued another draft of the Applicant Guidebook on May 30. See May
2011 New gTLDApplicant Guidebook, supra note 131. That draft had gone further to meet
GAC objections while still falling short of GAC proposals in several key areas, including: the
documentation for GAC consensus advice; a variety of issues relating to the rights to be given
trademark holders vis-h-vis domain name registrants and would-be registrants; and the ques-
tion of registry-registrar cross-ownership. See Governmental Advisory Comm., GAC
comments on the Applicant Guidebook (April 15th, 2011 version), ICANN (May 26, 2011),
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-comments-new-gtids-26may l -en.pdf.
135. See Approved Board Resolutions, ICANN (June 20, 2011), http://www.icann.org/
en/minutes/resolutions-20jun 11 -en.htm; Rationale: Remaining Areas of Difference Between
ICANN's Board and Governmental Advisory Committee Regarding Implementation of the
New gTLD Program, ICANN (June 20, 2011), http://www.icann.orglen/minutes/rationale-
gac-response-new-gtld-20jun11 -en.pdf.
The ICANN Board backed down on the prerequisites for GAC consensus advice. See
supra note 121. It explained that "[f]urther discussions are needed ... to find a mutually
agreed [upon] and understandable formulation for the communication of actionable GAC
consensus advice regarding proposed new gTLD strings." Id.
136. See Monika Ermert, EU's Kroes Not Amused By ICANN Decision on New TLDs,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (June 22, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/06/22/eus-
kroes-not-amused-by-icann-decision-on-tlds.
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The second relates to how institutional design channels that influence. If
the GAC is to engage early in the process like any other policy participant, it
must accept that its views will not always prevail. If it is to assert a pre-
sumptive veto late in the process, advising the Board directly, then it has the
political disadvantage of opposing a policy resolution that has already
gained momentum and support, and of seeking to introduce more delay into
a process that could otherwise be completed more quickly. The GAC would
like to exercise strong authority on both of those levels, but that does not seem
workable or sustainable. It will not have credibility as a participant in the or-
dinary policy process unless it demonstrates willingness to accept the results
of that process. And it does not appear at this point to have the leverage it
would need to overpower a Board determined to assert its independence.
The United States has strongly advocated a "multistakeholder" model
for ICANN, dating back to the WSIS negotiations, based on the idea that
governments, industry representatives, and civil society representatives
should all participate together in the Internet naming and numbering dis-
course.137 But the idea of multistakeholderism, without more, says nothing
about how disputes between the various actors should be resolved.
ICANN's current instantiation of the multistakeholder approach seems
to be that it develops policy through a somewhat-structured bottom-up pro-
cess described in its bylaws, and then the GAC brings as much political
influence to bear as it can, in order to change those aspects of ICANN's
plans that American and European governments, and their most influential
business lobbies, are dissatisfied with. That process worked in the recent
gTLD policy process, in the sense that the GAC was pretty successful in
pushing ICANN policy outcomes in its preferred direction. But there are
limits to how successful the approach can be: notwithstanding the pendency
of the IANA contract, the United States and other GAC nations have only
limited levers of power over ICANN. ICANN is now institutionally well
established. Moreover, the integrity and coherence of ICANN's processes
depend on the Board's respecting the results of GNSO negotiation.
Multistakeholderism differs from the conventional ICANN policy pro-
cess in important ways. ICANN's conventional policy process is an
awkward mash-up of a representation-based system, in which representa-
tives of various industry groupings vote in a variety of subsidiary bodies,'38
and an administrative-agency-modeled system, in which agency staffers
consider input from interested parties in making their own policy deci-
sions.139 The current multistakeholder process is less structured: it involves
the provision of a forum in which an entity representing world governments
137. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
138. See Generic Names Supporting Organization, ICANN, http://gnso.icann.org/
council/members.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (describing the Council of the Generic
Names Supporting Organization).
139. See Weinberg, supra note 50, at 15-16.
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can engage in free-form negotiations with the ICANN Board and staff, with
the goal of winning all those policy concessions it turns out to have the po-
litical throw-weight to extract.
It has always been the case at ICANN that pressure by those with influ-
ence and power gets results.140 To a significant extent, ICANN processes
have tended to locate power in the set of folks privileged to sit at the policy-
making table; its discussion mechanisms have also tended to privilege some
participants over others.141 In that respect, ICANN policy processes bring to
mind what I have called a "bargaining" model of governance, in which poli-
cy-making is accomplished largely through negotiation based on relative
bargaining power and appeals to shared values.142 That model has virtues but
also key disadvantages-it falls short when it comes to transparency, rules
that can constrain policy wielders to serve public rather than private values,
and processes that ensure that all voices are heard.143
Long-time ICANN watchers, who remember ICANN's 2000 selection
of new gTLDs'" or its 2001 negotiation of new gTLD contracts,145 are fa-
miliar with just that lack of transparency and rule-boundedness. Civil
society participants have pushed back against ICANN's insider nature,
though, and ICANN has made progress on the transparency front.146 ICANN
has self-consciously (though with mixed success) addressed itself to the
question of how best to avoid "capture," structuring its policy process so that
it is more than simply a raw battle over which side has more political pull at
a given moment.147
The GAC "multistakeholder" process, by contrast, follows a pure ver-
sion of the bargaining model: GAC-Board interactions are little more than
the exercise of political influence to the extent of the political actors' bar-
gaining power. It is plain why the United States government likes the
multistakeholder model; it thinks it can get what it needs under those
140. See Jonathan Weinberg, Geeks and Greeks, 3 INFo. 313, 328 (2001).
141. See id.; Weinberg, supra note 50, at 15 ("ICANN had emphasized negotiation
among stakeholders-representatives of government and industry groups deemed sufficiently
important players to get a seat at the bargaining table. It initially identified agreement among
these groups as the 'consensus' it was created to identify and implement."); see also Jochen
von Bernstorff, Democratic Global Internet Regulation? Governance Networks, International
Law and the Shadow of Hegemony, 9 EUR. LJ. 511, 514 (2003).
142. See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and
the United States, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 615, 623-25 (1991).
143. See id. at 730-31.
144. See Weinberg, supra note 107, at 3.
145. See Weinberg, supra note 140, at 322-25.
146. See The Berkman Centr. for Internet & Soc'y at Harvard Univ., supra note 70, at
10 ("In recent years, ICANN has taken important actions ... to improve its accountability and
transparency .... ); id. at 2 (stating that while ICANN has made "significant progress in
improving its public participation mechanisms," transparency "deficits" persist).
147. See Draft Implementation Plan for Improving Institutional Confidence, ICANN
(Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.icann.org/en/jpa/iic/draft-iic-implementation-
26feb09-en.pdf.
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informal processes because it has sufficient influence to do so. From the
perspective of coherent regulatory forms, though, that does not seem like an
improvement.
CONCLUSION
ICANN was born out of a self-contradictory attempt to "privatize" the
domain name system (DNS); its relationship with national governments has
been fraught ever since. The GAC's recent assertion of a more powerful role
in ICANN has exposed a fundamental incoherence in the ICANN structure:
governments neither are part of the ICANN policy process nor can they
work effectively outside of it. This has resulted in a "dysfunctional" 48
Board-GAC relationship, and recently led to saber-rattling and uncomforta-
ble decision-making. Moreover, there is no straightforward way to fix the
problem.
This story speaks to both the limitations and the power of formal struc-
tures for involvement in ICANN's (and other entities') decision-making
process. On the one hand, governmental influence in the ICANN process
has long been defined less by the "law on the books" of formal relationships
than by the "law on the ground" created by the potential for varying degrees
of influence between governmental and nongovernmental actors. Govern-
ments have influence; they have always been able to express views to
ICANN outside of any formal process; and ICANN's key task has always
been-as one of its early CEOs put it-to "work from within the system to
balance competing interests."'49 Just as U.S. administrative agencies operate
within a multi-institutional political environment, seeking to navigate
among the various actors wielding power in that environment, so does
ICANN negotiate with the wielders of power in its own environment.
At the same time-as in the administrative agency context-
institutional design matters. Institutional design mediates power
relationships in a political environment without dictating those relationships.
The challenge facing ICANN relates not only to the degree of power gov-
ernments can exert in its processes, but even more importantly to the
institutional procedures and mechanisms within which that power is to be
exercised.
148. See ATRT Report, supra note 98, at 36.
149. Mike Roberts, Comments on the Civil Society Statement, COMPUTER PROFESSION-
ALS FOR Soc. RESP. (July 30, 2000), http://cpsr.org/prevsite/internetdemocracy/Statement
July-13 Comments.html, quoted in Weinberg, supra note 140, at 328.
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